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Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*
I RATES AND REGULATION
The survey year seems, as far as the law of Insurance in New Jersey
is concerned, to have been more portentous than eventful. Across the
river in New York, it has been decided that a company may be a partial
subscriber to a rating bureau.' Now, another company is attempting,
with at least partial success, to write certain types of fire insurance
there at 20% less than the bureau rate.2 These inroads on the bureau
structure in New York will certainly have an effect throughout the
country in the years to come. But what came to New York with a shout
will probably come to New Jersey with a whisper. It is not in the nature
of things for the same warriors to fight the same battle forty-eight times'
over with undiminished verve.
3
The other big battle of this year is over the entry of the Federal
Trade Commission into the field of insurance regulation with a full-
dress investigation of misleading advertising in the accident and health
business.4 It does not seem likely that New Jersey will be directly
affected; N.J. REV. STAT. 17:2 9 B seems to be as comprehensive a regula-
tion as possible of misleading advertising, and of anything else that
might invoke the jurisdiction of the FTC, including coercion, boycott,
and intimidation. Since the McCarran Act eliminates the business of
insurance from the operation of the acts enforced by the FTC to the
extent the business is regulated by the states,5 our regulation should
be adequate to exclude the FTC. The McCarran Act preserves the ap-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
i. Cullen v. Bohlinger, 136 N.Y.S.2d 361 (App. Div. 1955) (affirming without
opinion the order of the Superintendent of Insurance), appeal dismissed 3o8 N.Y.
886, 126 N.E.2d 564 (1955). An appeal is being taken to the United States Supreme
Court. National Underwriter, June 9, 1955, p. 3. The appeal is evidently based on
some theory that the data accumulated by the bureau are being confiscated, or being
made the basis of unfair competition with bureau members. The contentions were
not regarded by the Court of Appeal as of sufficient substance to support an appeal
as of right. The Supreme Court will no doubt deal as summarily with them.
2. The latest on this is in the National Underwriter, July 7, 1955, p. 1, reporting
that the New York Department has allowed only a 15% cut.
3. See the National Underwriter, June 23, 1955, p. 13, for maneuverings over a
similar 2o% rate cut by the same company in Washington.
4. National Underwriter, Jan. 6, 1955, pp. 1, 6; July 28, 1955, pp. 17, 22. The
only previous federal intervention has been a few dragged-out anti-trust suits against
local agency groups. National Underwriter, Jan. 27, 1955, p. 2; Feb. 10 1955, P. 12.
5. 59 STAT. 34 (1945); 61 STAT. 448 (1947); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1952).
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plication of the Sherman Act to cases of coercion, boycott, and intimida-
tion even though regulated by the states,6' but since the FTC has no
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act as such, and the operations of the
Department of Justice in the realm of insurance have thus far been
minor,7 there would seem to be no immediate fear of federal interven-
tion in the insurance picture in New Jersey. The chief danger to be
apprehended is that the FTC investigations will turn up such significant
failures in the regulatory patterns of other states that Congress will
decide to scrap the McCarran Act as a failure. Furthermore, if the
McCarran Act turns out to have failed to keep the federal government
entirely out of the supervisory picture, the companies themselves may
throw their weight behind full federal regulation, rather than attempt
to operate under a dual system.8
If clouds are gathering for state regulation from the direction of the
FTC, the United States Supreme Court has opened vast new horizons
for it. While our local Supreme Court was deciding 4-3 that the liability
policy of a deceased non-resident tortfeasor could not be used as a
basis for granting administration of his estate in New Jersey, 9 the federal
tribunal was holding that a state may make a non-resident's insurance
company directly suable on an accident occurring within its borders. 10
The Louisiana Direct Action Statute thus upheld seems to be re-
sponsive to conditions that do not obtain except in Louisiana," but it
might be adopted elsewhere to provide a device for reaching the non-
resident motorist that would have much to recommend it over the
traditional substituted service scheme. It would not require the form-
ality of making service on a public official, would not require the
registered letter to the non-resident motorist, and, best of all, would
eliminate a whole series of coy moves and countermoves directed at
or against informing the jury that the burden of a judgment will rest
on the insurance company.
If we are not to go to this extreme, rejecting the ingenious program
offered by the plaintiff's lawyer in the Roche case would seem to have
been an unfortunate move. Appointing an administrator to be sued
and defended under the decedent motorist's insurance policy would be
an admirable way to avoid the impact of the rule that the estate of a
6. 59 STAT. 34 (1945); 61 STAT. 448 ('947); 15 U.S.C. § 1O3 (b) (1952).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. For a typical expression by an insurance man of these areas of concern, see
National Underwriter, March 24, 1955, p. 6.
9. In re Roche, 16 N.J. 579, 109 A.2d 655 (1954).
io. Watson v. Employers Liability Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
ii. LA. REV. STAT. § 22.983 (1950). The appellate review of jury verdicts seems
to be considerably broader in the Louisiana state courts than in the federal courts.
Since most insurance companies are not incorporated in Louisiana, the direct action
statute seems to provide the necessary diversity of citizenship to channel the bulk
of Louisiana's personal injury litigation into the federal courts--much to the an-
noyance of the latter.
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deceased motorist is immune from service Under the Nonresident
Motorists Act.1 2 But as the case presented itself, only the accident was
local. The victim was a New Yorker as well as the deceased tortfeasor.
Perhaps the majority, by referring to the lack of local creditors as one
reason for denying administration, has left the way open for a New
Jersey plaintiff to fare better with the same device.
But the most portentous of all the portents of the survey year was the
Wilburn Boat case' 3 in which the federal Supreme Court held that
the states could regulate marine insurance as fully as other lines. Thus
far, no state has seen fit to pick up the option. Since New Jersey has no
general statute altering the effect of warranties in the manner of the
Texas statute involved in Wilburn Boat, the case should have no effect
in New Jersey unless the Legislature decides to act under it.
The problem of regulating marine insurance seems to be that it
deals with two kinds of subject matter. The first is the traditional mari-
time venture, often world-wide in scope, almost always carried out
under ancient customs and an international and esoteric legal system.
In this venerable and cosmopolitan legal world, the prospect of state
regulation is an anathema to all concerned.
On the other hand, more and more insurance is being written on
vessels of an entirely different sort-pleasure craft, and craft used in
small local businesses. The owners of these vessels are people who need
the protection afforded them by state regulation in their insurance trans-
actions, and have the right to expect it. Furthermore, a great deal of
this coverage is being written not by marine companies, but by fire
and casualty companies used to state regulation, and somewhat at a
loss when asked to proceed without it.
Several solutions to the problem thus posed may be considered. The
most obvious would be to draw some arbitrary line between the two
types of insured-as by tonnage, value, area of operation, or something
of the kind. Another alternative might be to leave the marine form un-
regulated, but develop a practice of insuring small marine risks -under
variants of traditional fire, casualty, and inland marine coverages, all
of which are regulated in one way or another. Such a practice might well
have competitive advantages against the marine form, particularly if
the marine coverages could be combined in one policy form with non-
marine coverages. The advantage of this alternative is that it would
tend to restrict the marine form-largely a seventeenth-century English
translation of a fourteenth-century Italian document-to those who
know how to use it, while the local agent could afford the coverage his
clients need on forms that he can understand and can explain to his
12. Young v. Potter Title & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 561, 178 At. 177 (Sup. Ct.
1935), aff'd, 115 N.J.L. 518, 181 At. 44 (1935)
13. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 3io (1955).
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insured. 14 On the other hand, the drawing of a line between regulated
and unregulated marine policy risks would enable the companies in-
suring small risks to take advantage of the marine form with its seagoing
experience. Perhaps if the actual formulation of the line were left to
an administrative agency there would be no great difficulty. Whatever
is decided, the large shippers and their insurers, who are bargaining
equals, will probably be able to work out an arrangement whereby
they are not unduly burdened.
Meanwhile, the Wilburn Boat case should go a long way toward
silencing those who had persisted in contending that insurance under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was not
subject to state regulation. This, and several maritime employers' lia-
bility coverages, have long been written by endorsement on the policy
used to afford insurance under the state workmen's compensation laws,
and rates for them are included in the manuals put out by various rating
agencies. Since the McCarran Act leaves in an equivocal position any
system of bureau rates that is not subject to state regulation, the states,
including New Jersey, that do not clearly regulate rates for these mari-
time coverages should take advantage of Wilburn Boat to enact legisla-
tion that will regularize the prevailing practices.
Another portent is the new statute that permits an insurer to combine
in one form with the Standard Fire Policy any other coverages it can
write.15 How significant such a law will turn out to be depends, of
course, on what coverages the companies decide to combine. Thus far,
the big candidates for combining have been the various coverages, ex-
clusive of automobile, needed by a typical member of the suburban
middle class-fire, personal liability, and one or two types of crime
lines or floater coverage on his personal effects. Policies issued in com-
binations of this sort become rather cumbersome looking, since they
have to incorporate verbatim the language of the standard fire policy
as required by statute,' and then have to add the several other cover-
ages in language more or less conformable to that developed for the
separate policy, each with its own set of exclusions and conditions. Until
the draftsmen break loose from their old moorings, and until the
legislatures let them break loose, we are apt to find that a really broad
package policy contains so much print as to carry built-in sales re-
sistance which the price advantages can only partly overcome. Even a
man who would be enthusiastic about not having to buy five policies
where one will do may feel that if he does have to buy five policies,
there is no point in buying them all glued together.
The development of the unified insurance policy is somewhat analo-
gous in its vicissitudes to the development of the unified civil action.
14. For an example of the kind of difficulty such an approach would go far toward
solving, see p. 231 infra.
15. N.J. Laws 1954, c. 268, § 7; N.J. REv. STAT. 17:36-5.20 (1954).
16. N.J. Laws 1954, c. 268, § 6; N.J. REV. STAT. 17:36-5.2o (1954).
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The business grew up in a set of statutory pigeonholes, responsive to
some view that it is immoral to have the premiums paid for one kind
of risk subjected to the payment of losses on another kind of risk.
Gradually, companies were authorized to diversify their varieties of
risks, until today in most states, including New Jersey, both fire and
casualty companies have full multiple-line authority-can write all
lines of insurance except life and title."7 But for some reason it was
often held by regulatory authorities that allowing a company to write
several lines of insurance did not allow it to write several lines on one
policy.'8 Hence the instant statute. There would now seem to be no
legal obstacle to satisfactory combination policies in New Jersey except
the standard fire policy law. But the practical obstacles and the psy-
chological obstacles are manifold.19 Every line of insurance has its own
rating system, supported by its own set of statistics, and often
promulgated by its own rating organization. Combining, for instance,
into an indivisible premium the rate for a man's fire insurance,
which varies with the type of construction of his house, with
that for his automobile insurance, which varies with his age, is no
mean feat. Meanwhile, when the rating data have been compiled over
some years under a certain choice paragraph of policy language, compa-
nies display a natural reluctance to abandon it in favor of new lan-
guage. Hence the verbiage on the combination policies. The home-
owners' combination policies, inaugurated locally with the new statute,
seem to have solved the rating obstacles to the satisfaction of the com-
panies writing them, for they are written on an indivisible premium.
Verbally, they leave a good deal to be desired, but would not be too
bad if they did not have to incorporate the standard fire policy. These
forms, however represent only a modicum of combination, and even
as far as they go, have not commended themselves to all concerned.
Further expansion, whether in the scope of coverage afforded, or in
the volume of business done under the combination forms, will raise
the same problems again. It is to be hoped that more favorable legis-
lation, coupled with greater underwriting experience, will eventually
bring the combination policy into its own. Meanwhile, the inland
marine forms, which have been multiple peril coverages from the start,
are being expanded-somewhat extra-legally-into more and more new
areas.
20
17. N.J. REV. STAT. 17:17-1 (1954).
18. See, e.g., Weekly Underwriter [1952] Insurance Department Rulings, Con-
necticut i.
19. The problems of gearing the bureau structure to multiple-line underwriting
have been dealt with at some length in a recent report by the New York Insurance
Department of their regular examination of the National Bureau. This aspect of
the report is summarized at some length in the National Underwriter, March 24,
1955, p- 7.
2o. E.g., National Underwriter, Feb. 1O, 1955, p. 12.
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Another thing to watch in the coming year or so is the perennial
problem of the uninsured -motorist. The New Jersey Unsatisfied Judg-
ment Fund has just begun paying off unsatisfied judgments. The system
works rather like the Unsatisfied Judgment Insurance that is being
written by a few companies elsewhere as an adjunct to conventional
automobile insurance. The differences are that in New Jersey the
coverage is written by a pool of insurers instead of by individual com-
panies, the premium is hidden in the rates for other kinds of automo-
bile insurance, and all insured motorists have to buy the coverage
whether they want it or not. Why this is better than compulsory lia-
bility insurance is perhaps for the opponents of the latter to consider,
rather than for this writer. Meanwhile, as the zero hour approached,
the Legislature fidgeted nervously with the administration of the Unsat-
isfied Judgment Fund; 21 the advocates of compulsory insurance offered
a plan that would make the uninsured motorist a disorderly person but
would omit all objectionable administrative enforcement machinery, 22
and the Governor came out in favor of automobile accident compensa-
tion.
The Legislature recessed until August without passing on the Pru-
dential's proposed legislation that would permit the writing of the
so-called variable annuity.2 This annuity would entitle the annuitant
to a certain number of "units" in a fund that would be invested in
common stocks and other high-yield investments. The scheme works
roughly in this fashion: The annuitant pays annually until the annuity
matures a fixed number of dollars. He is credited with the number of
units that number of dollars represents according to the most recent
valuation of the fund (dollar value of holdings divided by number of
units outstanding). When the annuity matures, he will be given the
option of withdrawing X units immediately at the then dollar value of
the unit, or of accepting Y units annually as long as he lives at the dollar
value for each year of payment. X and Y will be stated in the contract
as functions of the number of units credited to the annuitant through
his annual payments. The number of units outstanding will be in-
creased by the number paid in and decreased by the number paid out,
so that the dollar value of the unit will reflect only the investment
results of the fund, not the amounts paid in or out. If the value of these
investments is responsive to the same economic factors as the cost of
living, the annuitant should be able to provide himself with a hedge
against increased living costs by foregoing the windfall that might be
afforded by fixed annuity in case living costs went down.
21. N.J. Laws 1955 c. 1.
22. Assembly Bill No. 1i8 (955), National Underwriter, Feb. io, 1955, p. 15.
23. Assembly Bills Nos. 305-7 (1955). The Prudential's position is that the vari-
able annuity is now legal, but that existing laws with respect to accounting and
reserves make it impractical to write it. For the controversy these bills have pro-
voked, see, e.g., New York Herald Tribune, May 26, 1955, P. 29, c01. 2.
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This seems like a good plan, and the necessary legislation should be
adopted. It has been argued that it will put the life companies in un-
warranted competition with the investment trusts, and this is true in
that both are candidates for the savings of the citizen. But it is pointed
out that they differ markedly in that. the company assumes the actuarial
risk of the variable annuity just as it does with a fixed annuity, and
that the cancellation of the variable annuity before maturity will be
a sufficiently lengthy process to prevent its use for speculative purposes.
Arguments and counter-arguments have also been advanced as to
whether the variable annuity has unfair tax advantages over the other
forms of savings. Whatever the merits of these arguments may be, they
seem properly addressed to the framers of tax laws, rather than to those
considering the appropriateness of the variable annuity as such. Unless
someone can point out a way in which the proposed contract is detri-
mental to the public, the regulatory laws should not be so framed as to
keep it from being written.
II NEW FORMS
The three most important casualty forms in national use have been
revised during the survey year. The major revisions are more of under-
writing than of legal significance, 24 but a few points deserve the at-
tention of lawyers. The most important of these is perhaps the articula-
tion of the doctrine of severability, which has been productive of a
spate of litigation in recent years. The doctrine calls for interpreting
the word "insured" to mean only the person claiming coverage in the
particular instance, and not any other person who may be within the
definition of the word. It operates to afford coverage for instance, to an
omnibus insured who injures an employee of the named insured, as
against the contention that coverage is excluded by the clause that
excludes injury to "any employee of the insured." This doctrine has
always been in accordance with the intent of the framers and under-
writers of the form, but enough cases have rejected it to make its
specific inclusion desirable.25 It appears in the new form in the words:
"The term 'the insured' is used severally and not collectively...
Another important change in the automobile policy is to be found
in the condition extending the coverage to comply with the Financial
Responsibility Laws of the various states. Under the new form, this
clause is only applicable where the policy is "certified as proof of
24. Such as the inclusion of the spouse of the named insured in the automobile
policy as an insured, and as one whose permission to operate the car is effective
under the omnibus clause, the exclusion of "dram shop" liability from the liability
policy, the exclusion of war risk from contractual and emergency medical coverage
under the liability policy, and from medical payments coverage under the auto-
mobile policy, and various broadenings of coverage under the workmen's compen-
sation and employers' liability policy, particularly with respect to disease.
25. E.g., Standard Surety & Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 281 App. Div. 446,
19 N.Y.S. 2d 795 (4 th Dept. 1953).
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financial responsibility for the future." This is evidently intended to
avoid the result of Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bingham,26 in which
it was held that a policy issued on the old form to a person of whom
such proof should be required is conformed to the standards required
by the law for policies certified as proof of financial responsibility for
the future, even though the policy was not so certified, and the insured
was never called on to file such proof. It is quite likely, however, that
the result in Bingham was considered by the court to be dictated by the
statute regardless of the wording of the policy.
The new language has also the disadvantage of not providing the
insured with automatic protection against the severe inconveniences
imposed by the typical Financial Responsibility Law on a motorist who,
at the time of an accident, does not have in force a policy conforming
to other standards, usually less rigorous than those required of the
policy accepted as proof of financial responsibility for the future. In
fact, the policy probably conforms to the standards of all the states for
this type of coverage, but the omission of the automatic feature im-
poses a considerable responsibility on the draftsmen of the policy not to
make a mistake in the coverage they afford.
The automobile policy has also been extended to afford coverage in
the case, hitherto somewhat troublesome, in which someone operating
the vehicle injures a private garage. Such cases have usually been re-
garded as within the exclusion of property owned by, transported by,
rented to, or in charge of the insured. Garages rented to or in charge
of the insured are now excepted from the operation of this exclusion.
The language of the old form excluding from the "drive other cars"
coverage automobiles "owned by, hired as part of a frequent use of
hired automobiles by, or furnished for regular use to the named in-
sured or a member of his household" has been amended by the omis-
sion of the reference to hired automobiles, and by the addition of the
word "either" before the words "the named insured." What is left of
this exclusion should be enforceable according to its intent, supersed-
ing the Pray case 27 in the Sixth Circuit, which held that the old lan-
guage did not exclude a car owned by a member of the household.
The revision of the Comprehensive General Liability Policy is
marked by a splendid job of cleaning up the troublesome "products"
definition. Cases like McAllister, discussed below, should no longer arise
under it. 2 8 The application of this definition to concrete cases must
26. 1o N.J. 46o, 92 A.2d 1 (1952).
27. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 204 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1953).
28. See p. 237 infra. The only remaining difficulty is the title. The words " (In-
cluding Completed Operations)" appear with the term "Products" in the declara-
tions page, but something of the kind should be added to the name of the hazard,
as it appears in the body of the policy, and in the endorsement that will be added
excluding it if the insured chooses not to buy it. "Products-Completed-Operations
Hazard" is an inelegant term, but one which may save insurers a good deal of
money.
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always require a certain amount of judicial intervention, because the
utility of drawing a line is more apparent than where it should be
drawn. It seems, however, that the draftsmen have succeeded this time
in framing a definition that will preserve intact the extensive body of
case law applying the distinction under the old language, and, at the
same time, make the underwriting intent apparent to the judiciary and
to insureds in future cases.
Less commendable is the amendment of the definition of "insured"
whereby, if the insured is a partnership, a partner is covered "only with
respect to his liability as such," instead of the former "while acting
within the scope of his duties as such." The old term has been judicially
construed to include what is covered under the new, so the only effect of
the amendment would seem to be to exclude coverage to a partner
individually for negligent torts committed by him personally in the
course of the partnership business.2 9 Why he ought to be worse off in
this respect than the executive officer of a corporation, who is still
covered while acting within the scope of his duties as such, is hard to
see.
Another change in this definition is the addition of the words "and
any organization or proprietor with respect to real estate management
for the named insured." The purpose of this language is evidently to
enable a managing agency to be insured on the owner's policy, but it
is so drawn that there is apt to be trouble if the companies have it in
mind to distinguish between an "organization or proprietor" and a mere
janitor or superintendent.
The affording of coverage for liability under scheduled contracts not
automatically included has been made the subject of a new endorse-
ment which should go far toward clarifying just what is and is
not covered. Among other things, the problem of liability imposed in
arbitration proceedings is addressed. If the arbitration agreement per-
mits the company to exercise the insured's rights in the choice of arbi-
trators and the conduct of arbitration proceedings, the company will
defend the proceedings and pay the award up to the policy limits;
otherwise, it will do neither. If, however, the company schedules on
such an endorsement a contract containing an .arbitration clause in
which it cannot exercise the insured's rights, it is still in danger of
being held to have waived these restrictions on its liability for arbitra-
tion awards.8 0 Indeed, many of the exclusions contained in this endorse-
ment might not stand up if a contract was scheduled which subjected
29. The writer has been informed that the underwriting intent was not to work
such an exclusion, but to negative the possibility of the company's being held to a
liability unconnected with the partnership business. This danger seems illusory
under the old language.
30. See Madawick Contracting Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 307 N.Y. I1i, 120
N.E.2d 520 (1954) (scheduling a contract for contractual coverage makes insurer
liable to pay award made pursuant to arbitration clause in contract).
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the insured for the most part to liabilities excluded from the coverage
afforded. The way out for the company would seem to be either to read
each contract carefully before covering it, or to schedule contracts in
general terms, rather than referring to specific contracts.
In this endorsement, as well as in the policy itself with respect to
contracts automatically covered, there appears a new exclusion of "any
obligation for which the insured may be held liable in an action on a
contract or an agreement by a person not a party thereto." The appli-
cation of this clause is somewhat speculative, but most of the possibili-
ties are not apt to commend themselves to .the courts. The language is
perhaps designed to reach the situation in which the insured under-
takes a contractual duty the breach of which may cause harm to third
persons. Under such circumstances it is possible that the insured would
be liable even though the other party to the contract were not liable.
It is by no means certain, however, that this liability will be regarded
as contractual at all. Even though the underlying duty is raised by a
contract, the breach of that duty gives rise to an action that sounds in
tort,8 1 and may not be excluded either by the new language or by the
exclusion which applies with certain listed exceptions to any "liability
assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement." 32 The drafts-
manship with respect to contracts, then, still leaves a good deal to be
desired. Fortunately, however, the new policy, by dealing with warran-
ties separately from contracts generally, prevents products cases from
being exposed to most of the -difficulties of contractual coverage.
The most extensive revision was that of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion and Employers' Liability Policy. The new form embodies most of
the provisions included on the old by endorsement, assimilates the
language as much as possible to that developed for the other third-party
liability forms, and standardizes the endorsements affording voluntary
compensation, maritime coverage, and "all states" coverage. Coverage
no longer depends on the reporting of payroll for premium purposes,
as it did under the old form; if the policy applies in a state at all, it
covers all employees and operations 33 in that state not expressly ex-
cluded by endorsement. The possibility of an uninsured liability for a
disease that is neither an accident nor an occupational disease, which
troubled some lawyers under the old form, has been met by making the
employers' liability coverage applicable to all disease. These coverages
have not been very litigious for many years, and the new policy is
31. Milford v. Bangor Ry. Sc Elec. Co., 104 Me.233, 71 At. 759 (1908).
32. See Larsen v. General Cas. Co., 99 F. Supp. 300 (D. Minn. 1951). A case that
has troubled claims departments for years, and is still up in the air, is this: Insured
agrees to keep A supplied with oil for his furnace all winter. A runs out of oil, and
his pipes freeze and burst. Insured is sued for the damage.
33. Except farm and domestic employment, which is not covered unless described
in the declarations.
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broad enough so there will not be too much likelihood of litigation in
the future. It remains to be seen what loopholes will develop.
III CASES
With all these thought-provoking factors elsewhere, the judicial
developments in the law of insurance proper during the survey year
seem fairly dry. Of some interest however is the holding that a reim-
bursement clause on a policy issued to comply with the federal Motor.
Carrier Act entitles the company to reimbursement for a settlement
made without any participation by the insured.34 The court seems to
have left room for relieving the insured in case of bad faith or negli-
gence on the part of the company in settling the case, but leaves the
burden of showing such bad faith or negligence on the insured. The
case seems to involve no earth-shaking policy decisions. The company
had sent the insured a disclaimer of coverage before the settlement
negotiations were entered into, and the insured could have assumed
the handling of the case itself at that time, had it chosen to do so. It is
unlikely that the insured will be subjected to a similar reimbursement
suit where the company has sent no disclaimer letter, since in the
absence of a disclaimer the assumption by the insurer of the defense
and settlement of the case would operate as a waiver of these policy
defenses that can be waived, and, if carried through to concllusion, as
an estoppel to deny coverage. Since the reimbursement clause is made
operative by a loss that the company would not have had to pay except
for its extension of coverage to comply with the Motor Carrier Act,
anything that would indicate a waiver or estoppel binding the insurer
even in the absence of such an extension of coverage would seem to be
available to the insured to defeat a claim for reimbursement.
Other decisions involve chiefly points of policy interpretation. How
much work a man dying of cancer can do and still be disabled,35 or
whether money stolen from a corporate officer at a party was being
conveyed by a messenger8 3 are questions of interest only to those who
must answer the same questions another time, and West indexes them
admirably. More interesting to us are the methods used by the courts
in handling questions of policy interpretation.
Of the various canons of interpretation current i n our courts, one
which has proved particularly dangerous is that which requires the
policy to be taken as a whole. Now, insurance policy forms, as everyone
knows who has concocted them, are things of shreds and patches.
34. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. A.E.A. Co., 32 N.J. Super. 471, io8 A.2d 464
(App. Div. 1954).
35. Fannick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. Super. 556, 113 A.2d 28 (App.
Div. 1955). See p. 240 infra.
36. Trad Television Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Ins. Co., 35 N.J. Super. 36, ii5
A.2d 47 (App. Div. 1955) (it wasn't).
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Underlying the form is basic language that was drafted by a group of
men who are now dead, meeting in a hotel that has been torn down,
considering a situation that no longer obtains. Succeeding generations
have cut and pasted, changing a phrase to cover a new situation, adding
an exclusion to cover a situation that. they were unable to persuade
some court was already excluded, providing for a situation that was
not foreseen when the first draft was done, leaving alone what has
proven serviceable in the past. Today, when an insurance man wishes to
draw up a new policy, he gets out one of the printed forms in his com-
pany's file drawers, a pair of scissors, and a jar of mucilage, and sets to
work, just as those who have gone before him have done. In addition
to changes in the printed form itself, there may be amendments to adapt
the printed form to other circumstances. These will be embodied in
slips of paper of varying shapes and sizes, to be pasted, pinned, or
clipped onto the printed form as the occasion demands. Occasionally,
instead, they are made up in the form of rubber stamps to use on any
white area the printed form may present. Under the circumstances, the
policy may be a functional whole, but it is hardly a literary whole. Two
cases-fortunately not from our appellate courts-decided since this
subject was last surveyed have failed, alas, to make this important
distinction.
The first 87 is this: It seems that in March of 1884 a pump on a ship
named the Inchmaree was damaged by being run with a valve closed
that should have been opened. The insurer resisted payment under its
policy on the ground that the loss was not caused by any of the perils
assumed under the following language:
And touching the adventures and perils which [are covered] they are,
of the seas, men-of-war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons,
letters of mart and countermart, surprisals, takings at sea, arrests, re-
straints and detainments of all kings, princes, and people of what nation,
condition, or quality soever, barratry of the master and mariners, and of
all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the
hurt, detriment, or damage of the aforesaid subject-matter of this
insurance, or any part thereof.
The House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal, held that this
particular mishap was neither caused by any peril expressly listed nor
covered by the "all other perils" clause-which had to be interpreted
in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
38
To meet this decision, the trade adopted language, called the Inch-
maree clause, covering:
. .. loss of and/or damage to hull or machinery through the negligence
of master, mariners, engineer or pilots or through explosions, bursting
37. American Shops, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Phila., 26 N.J. Super. 145, 97
A.2d 513 (Essex Co. Ct., Law Div. 1953).
38 Thames and Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, Fraser & Co., L.R. 12 A.C.
484 (H.L. 1887).
INSURANCE
of boilers, breakages of shafts, or through any latent defect in the ma-
chinery. or hull, provided such loss or damage has not resulted from
want of due diligence by the owners of the vessel, or any of them, or
by the manager.
On the printed form involved in the case now under consideration
(denominated a "yacht policy" and issued on a 25' Chris Craft), this
clause appeared as quoted above. In addition to the printed matter,
the following language was placed on the policy with a rubber stamp:
Not liable for loss or damage to the rudder, propellor, shaft or ma-
chinery, unless caused by stranding, sinking, burning, or collision with
another vessel.
The policy thus printed and stamped was held to cover damage to the
engine of this Chris Craft due to a latent defect, against the contention
of the company that the stamped language was to prevail over the
written language. Having insisted that the policy was to be read as a
whole, meaning a literary whole, the court thought it necessary' to
search for a way of reading the stamped language as not inconsistent
with the Inchmaree clause. It found such a way by holding that the
stamped language, in virtue of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, applied
only to underwater machinery. In addition, it found that the two
clauses, if inconsistent after all, set up an ambiguity, which, of course,
must be resolved in favor of the insured.
Besides the other objections to which this process is open, it does
not accomplish its avowed purpose of reading the policy so as to make
a literary whole. For one thing, it is difficult to see what underwater
machinery a 25' Chris Craft may have besides her rudder, propellor,
or shaft; for another, there are no boilers to burst; there are no sails,
spars, or tackle like that described in the list of subjects of insurance.
Furthermore, while the list of perils assumed is not quoted in the
opinion, it is doubtless rather like that quoted above-the traditional
marine policy language, peopling the waters of Lake Hopatcong with
an improbable assortment of men-of-war, enemies, pirates, rovers, and
bearers of letters of mart and countermart. What really happened
here was that the insurer, when it decided to sell insurance to yacht
owners, took the venerable language of the marine policy, which has
afforded satisfactory insurance to generations of mariners, but which
has been subject to so long a process of judicial construction that no
man is wise enough to change it, and amended it with such overriding
provisions as it thought appropriate to the circumstances it was cover-
ing.
The policy read as an organic, and not a literary whole, is not too
difficult to see in these terms. The traditional marine coverage, ex-
pressed in the traditional language, is amended in certain specific
respects in which the foresight of the underwriter observes that it is
unfit for use on small pleasure craft. The relation to be considered is
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not merely one between two seemingly inconsistent clauses of the same
document, but between printed language obviously intended to apply
to a large vessel and language stamped on the form, presumably by
someone who knew it was going to be issued on a small craft. Even
disregarding any extrinsic knowledge we may have of the practice of
insurers of amending printed language by rubber stamps, it should be
fairly clear that that is what was done here. And indeed, there is no
more reason why a person should be able to insure the engine of a 25'
Chris Craft against mechanical breakdown than there is why he should
be able to insure the engine of his car against mechanical breakdown.
If items of this sort go before their time, the purchaser looks to the
manufacturer or dealer; if they go at the end of their expectable life
span, he should have no complaint.
The other recent case giving an unfortunate application to this
doctrine of taking the policy as a whole is the Gunther case.39 It in-
volved a Comprehensive Personal Liability Policy, a form meant basic-
ally to afford coverage as to non-business tort liability exclusive of
automobile liability. The language involved deals with the relation
between this policy and workmen's compensation coverage. The policy
excluded:
... bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of (i) any employee of
the insured while engaged in the employment of the insured, if benefits
therefor are either payable or required to be provided under any work-
men's compensation law; or (2) any residence employee of the insured
while engaged in the employment of the insured if the insured has in
effect on the date of the occurrence a policy providing workmen's com-
pensation benefits for such employee.
In Gunther, the court held that since (2) was a special provision for
residence employees, the insurer cannot have meant (i) to apply to
them. Thus, the insurer had to pay a workmen's compensation award
against the insured in favor of a residence employee, because the in-
sured had no policy in effect providing such benefits. The court was
unable to find any other interpretation of (1) that would give (2) any
reason for being in the policy.
The insurer offered an affidavit as to what it intended by (2). In
eleven states, it said, domestic servants can be brought under the work-
men's compensation laws by the act of buying a workmen's compensa-
tion policy covering them. In these states, (i) might be regarded by a
court as inapplicable, since workmen's compensation benefits are not
required to be provided, and are only payable by virtue of the existence
of a policy voluntarily purchased by the insured. The court quite
rightly pointed out that the legal reasoning supporting this misgiving
as to possible liability despite (1) is farfetched. But arguments of this
39. Gunther v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 33 N.J. Super. ioi, 1o9 A.2d 485
(Law Div. 1954).
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sort loom larger at forms committee meetings than they do in court, and
paper is cheap enough so that the draftsmen often end up by putting in
almost superfluous clauses to set their minds at rest on just such far-
fetched points. At any rate, such by affidavit was the intent of the
insurer. The court, however, far from disbelieving it, did not regard it
as putting in issue a material fact; it rendered summary judgment for
the insured. Instead of the actual intent of the insurer in using the
language under consideration, there was to be substituted a hypothetical
intent, based on the impression left by the language on a "reasonable
and disinterested third person"-in this case, a third person oblivious
of the situation in any state other than New Jersey, and possessed of a
singular confidence in the skill and determination with which the
draftsmen of the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (whose
form this is) avoid superfluity in the preparation of their policies. These
are strange draftsmen, who strain at a gnat of superfluity, but who do
not scruple to omit a major exception from the express language of
another clause.' 0
Here again, if we look at the policy as an organic whole, it should
give us no trouble. What we have is a catch-all kind of policy-one
which affords insurance for a very few dollars for a miscellany of sources
of liability, carefully excluding those which are the subjects of well-
established and far more expensive coverages. The policy is not only
cheap, it is very rough-and-ready actuarially. Unless the insured main-
tains two residences or has an elevator, he will pay neither more nor
less than $1o.oo for this policy regardless of his circumstances. The
reason why this lack of actuarial subtlety is possible is that the policy
covers a multitude of sources of liability all of which are of rather rare
occurrence. Were it to cover an insured's business, his car, or his air-
plane, it would have to operate on far more refined premium bases.
Otherwise, the man who has no car would have to pay a disproportion-
ate premium to reach a flat rate adequate to cover automobile liability.
In this context, the underwriting judgment that assimilates a servant
entitled to recover for any injury sustained on the job to the dispropor-
tionate risks like automobiles, but leaves a servant who can recover
only for negligence of the master, subject to the common-law defenses,
in a class with golf and roller skates left on the sidewalk, should be quite
understandable.
This is not to say that the draftsman should have the benefit of the
40. The National Bureau has amended the quoted language, so that it now
excludes:
... bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of any employee of the insured
arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured, if benefits
therefore are in whole or in part either payable or required to be provided
under any workmen's compensation law, or if the insured has in effect on the
date of such occurrence a policy providing workmen's compensation benefits
for such employee.
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policy as an organic whole to escape from the predicament in which he
is placed by his failures in drafting the policy provisions. He is certainly
responsible for the purport of his individual dispostions. But, if those
dispositions are to be altered by their juxtaposition with other disposi-
tions, it would seem that the alterations should be accomplished in
the light of the policy as an organic whole. The case of Prather v.
American Motorists Ins. Co.,41 relied on in both the cases under con-
sideration as establishing the doctrine that the policy must be read as
a whole, seems to support the foregoing reasoning at least as well as it
does the results reached in these two cases. This is the case: It seems
that the insured bought an automobile policy on a two-company form,
the Casualty Company making itself liable on the liability coverages,
the Fire Company on the physical damage coverages. Of the latter, the
insured bought only "comprehensive" (most losses except by collision)
at the inception date of the policy in April, 1946. But two months later,
he bought $5° deductible collision coverage, to expire October 1, 1946,
although the rest of the policy was to run until April, 1947.
This coverage was added by an endorsement, duly executed by both
companies, that listed, after its statement of the added coverage, all the
coverages then in force. On this list, after the words "$5o ded. collision"
appeared the parenthetical notation "(until October 1, 1946)." In
August, the insured got rid of his car and got another. An endorse-
ment was issued changing the coverage from the old to the new car, and
listing again the coverages in force. This endorsement lacked the paren-
thetical notation limiting the time of the collision coverage. This
August endorsement was, inadvertently, it seems, executed only by
the Casualty Company. In September, a new endorsement was added
reading the same as the August endorsement, but executed by both
companies. It was made retroactive to the August date. All three en-
dorsements were typed on a printed form that recited that it would
terminate with the policy. The question was whether collision coverage
existed after October i. Our Supreme Court held, with one dissent,
that it did not.
In arriving at this result, the court has, to be sure, read the policy
as a whole, but in a very different way from the courts in the two cases
just discussed. To any honest man reading the policy with these three
endorsements attached, it is evident that a hideous mistake has been
made. The notation "(until October 1, 1946)" that appeared on the
first endorsement has been left off of the last. Whether that mistake
can be rectified, and the policy applied as if the omitted words had been
present, depends on familiar principles which need not be taken up,
here. It need only be said that the decision does not depend on whether
the third endorsement can be given a different meaning in the light of
41. 2 N.J. 496, 67 A.2d 135 (1949).
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the first two from what it would have standing alone. It is clear that
the person who typed up the third endorsement was under the im-
pression that the insured had bought and paid for a full term of
collision coverage, and that such was not the case. The language of the
court about adopting a construction that gives effect to all the endorse-
ments cannot properly be read except in the light of these principles.
It was the endorsements as organic units, not their language, that was
being given effect. Thus, Prather should not be used to support the two
cases under consideration.
But behind this attempt to read the policy as a literary whole lies,
perhaps, a very real concern. Some of the foregoing discussion may
indicate what verbal hash the marine policy has become under the
hands of so many generations of scissors-and-pastepot draftsmen. The
comparatively few years our casualty forms have been in existence have
not sufficed to do quite the same, but the trend is discernible. The
reading given the policies in the two cases under consideration is
probably responsive to that trend, but does nothing to reverse it; in fact
it robs the forms of what little ready comprehensibility they had. In
each case, the clause actually involved was understandable by itself.
and became unclear only by its connection with other clauses. If a
layman is at sea reading the policy clause by clause, he is far more so
attempting the subtle process engaged in by the court in these two
cases. Furthermore, this type of reasoning is productive of the very
kind of draftsmanship at which it is directed. The atmosphere in which
insurance policy drafting is carried on is one of mistrust of the judiciary.
Superfluous clauses like the one involved in Gunther are multiplied
through apprehensiveness based on inability to predict what the courts
will do. If clarity is a desideratum, the approach adopted in these cases
will not serve it.
One panel of judges in the Appellate Division suggested an alterna-
tive, which is to leave the whole question of policy interpretation in
the hands of the jury.4 2 The particular question was whether a clause
in a burglary policy excluding loss "contributed to by any change in
the condition of the risk" referred to any change in the premises, or
only to such changes as made burglary materially more likely. The
mandate of the Appellate Division reversing a directed verdict for the
insured, seems to require that that question be left to the jury with no
kind of standards to guide them. In all probability, no direct evidence
of intent will be allowed to influence the decision. The idea that the
language means what a reasonable man would understand it to mean
furnishes some argument for employing the jury as our system's tradi-
tional embodiment of the reasonable man. But the disadvantages of
this method far outweigh any logical consistency there may be in it.
42. Clark-McCaffrey Co. v. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 32 N.J. Super. 138, io8 A.2d 32
.(App. Div. 1954).
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An insurance policy is underwritten with at least a certain amount of
precision. If the draftsman is to hope eventually to accomplish con-
comitant precision in his form, he is at least entitled to believe that the
words he uses will be interpreted the same way in every case. The
thrust of the statutory, policy that forbids an insurer to play favorites
is in the same direction. Accordingly, a canon of interpretation that
takes the job from the court and leaves it to a jury, whose determina-
tions have, of course, no precedent value, is open to strenuous objec-
tion.
To attempt to discern a better alternative, let us consider what the
ends are that should be achieved in the judicial consideration of in-
surance policies. First, the policy should be recognized for what it is,
and not dealt with under rules developed for the resolution of contro-
versies arising between citizens who have dickered over a horse at the
county fair. A policy form is printed, and sold on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, rather as a vacuum cleaner is sold. The product, the sales talk
runs, will do certain things; with appropriate attachments it will do
other things; still others it will not do. Except in the case of large
insureds whose cases seldom reach the courts, there is no negotiation
as to language. Second, insurance itself should be recognized for what
it is-a social function of vital importance in our society. It is in form
a private business, but it is one of the most heavily regulated private
businesses in our system, and the regulation is in great part concerned
with the content of the very documents that the courts are called on to
interpret. These range all the way from the fire policy, whose exact
language is fixed by statute, to the accident and health forms, which,
at least as to coverage, are little regulated. In between are the marine
form, whose meager and arcane language is governed by a body of de-
cisional law as venerable and almost as voluminous as that governing
the Statute of Frauds, and the casualty forms, which are subject to
regulation in most states, and, as a matter of practice, are submitted to
all state regulatory bodies before they are used. The trend toward
drafting policies on a bureau, rather than a company, level is growing,
and the responsiveness of the insurance business to social considera-
tions is growing with the centralization of the business in organizations
concerned with the survival and growth of the business as a whole, rather
than with competition between companies. These factors would seem
to point to a need for the handling of the insurance policy as a social,
rather than as a business document.
Finally, clarity of draftsmanship should be encouraged. For one
thing, it is entirely posssible for a policy form to get so complicated
that the judge will be unable to understand it even when it is ex-
plained to him. For another thing, if insurance is really to be responsive
to social requirements it is necessary that it be generally known what
insurance is being afforded. It is not necessary that every insured be
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aware of every limitation on his coverage, but the general scope of the
customary coverages should be generally known. The application of
any document in common use must depend in some part on reported
judicial constructions of its terms, but the general outlines should be
discernible from the text. This kind of clarity can best be achieved by
a fairly long-term dialogue between the draftsman and the judge, carried
out in an atmosphere of stability.
To achieve these standards, considerations dehors the policy language
should be brought in. It should not be enough, for instance, to ask
ourselves what a policy means, we should ask how clearly it means it,
and what it ought to mean. In other words, we must take the policy in
its social and underwriting contexts-as an organic whole. Let us con-
sider how this works. First, since the terms of the policy are not the
subjects of negotiation between insurer and insured, there is no reason
why it should be required that the insured fully understand the policy.
Insurance is sold in packages, and if the insured is given to understand
which of the available packages he is buying, and its general purport,
the exact content of the package can safely be left to the judiciary, the
rating bureaus, and the state regulatory authorities. Thus, terms like
"caused by accident" and "perils of the sea" and those appearing in the
products definition are left to judicial interpretation, without any
particular effort being made to apprise an insured of their exact limita-
tions.
On the other hand, the requirement that the insured be acquainted
with the general scope of the coverage he is buying calls for a more
exacting standard of clarity in dealing with terms inconsistent with the
general purport or apparent general purport of the policy. While terms
not inconsistent with that general purport can be left to the intepreta-
tion the courts will put on them after a careful reading in the light of
precedent and other relevant factors, inconsistent terms should be
given no effect at all against the insured unless they are clearly adverted
to in the policy-even if the judge can understand them. This is the
thrust of the McAllister case, decided by the Appellate Division in 1953,
and affirmed by the Supreme Court on Judge Bigelow's opinion. 43 It
involves a schedule liability policy which lists certain "hazards" and
affords coverage with respect to such of them as are indicated by typed
entries on the declarations page of the policy. One of the distinctions in
this schedule is that between the "premises-operations" hazard and the
"products" hazard. The breakdown is motivated by the fact that the
danger in the operation whereby a certain result is produced is in no
way a function of the danger in the result itself. Thus, a cleaner and
presser who uses steam boilers and naphtha will present a great risk
of liability arising out of the way he does his job, and little risk of
43. McAllister v. Century Indemnity Co. Hartford, 24 N.J. Super. 289, 94 A.2d
345 (App. Div. 1953), aff'd, 12 N.J. 395, 97 A.2d 16o (1953).
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liability arising out of his finished product, whereas a person who
wraps egg salad sandwiches may cost his insurer many thousands of
dollars in ptomaine cases before the process of sandwich wrapping
claims a single victim. Accordingly, the manuals by which liability in-
surance is rated contain for each class of business rates for the premises-
operations hazard based on the size of the plant or the number of
employees, and rates for the products hazard based on the dollar vol-
ume of business. The two hazards are kept separate on the policy by an
exclusion to the effect that nothing is covered under premises-opera-
tions that could be covered under products. In the policy involved in
this case the products hazard is defined as follows:
Division 3. Products. The handling or use of or the existence of any
condition in goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or dis-
tributed by the Named Insured, if the accident occurs after the Insured
has relinquished possession thereof to others and away from premises
owned, rented or controlled by the Insured; and operations covered
under Divisions 1 and 6 of the Definition of Hazards (other than pick-up
and delivery and the existence of tools, uninstalled equipment and
abandoned or unused materials), if the accident occurs after such opera-
tions have been completed or abandoned at the place of occurrence
thereof and away from such premises. 44
It will be noted that the part of the foregoing after the semicolon
is concerned not with the product of one who deals in goods, but with
the operation of one who deals in services. Anyone who has followed
the discussion thus far will perhaps accept with fairly good grace the
logic that assimilates the dichotomy between an operation going on
and an operation completed or abandoned to that between the making
of a product and the product itself. He may even see the validity of
the exceptions contained in the parentheses in the quoted language.
He may, however, be less than sympathetic with the choice of words,
or with the label "products."
At any rate, a policy in this form was issued to an excavator who did
not buy coverage for the "products hazard" but did buy coverage
for the "premises-operations hazard." He dug a hole, and filled it in,
so negligently, it was complained against him, that long after he had
done his work a person tripped in the depression he had left in the
sidewalk. The insured successfully defended his case after the company
had disclaimed, and he now seeks to recover his counsel fees. The
insurer contends that this is a products case, and, as such, excluded
from the premises-operations coverage the insured has bought. Judge
Bigelow in the Appellate Division makes short work of this contention:
A careful and repeated reading of the [exclusion and the quoted
language] only emphasizes the vagueness and ambiguity of the policy.
We are satisfied, however, that an excavator's liability insurance is
not offered under the heading "Products." 45
44. 24 N.J. Super. at 293, 94 A.2d at 347.
45. Id. at 294, 94 A.2d at 347.
INSURANCE
Then, after alluding to the necessity of construing strongly against
the insurer, he goes on to say:
The obvious object of the plaintiff in procuring this policy was
indemnity against liability on tort claims growing from his operations
as an excavator. The company seems, in general, to have intended by
the policy to afford him such indemnity for a limited period, the
policy year. Except as particular provisions of the policy so curtail
its scope that an ordinarily intelligent man would understand that
the policy does not cover certain risks which come within its general
scope-with that exception, the policy should be construed to cover
all liability for accidents arising from plaintiff's operations, whether
the accidents happened before or after the excavation job was finished.
We agree with the trial court that the company is liable on its policy
in respect to the claim that was asserted against plaintiff.4"
As Justice Brennan quite rightly points out in his dissent 47 from
the affirmance by the Supreme Court on Judge Bigelow's opinion,
there is no ambiguity in this language. Language is ambiguous when
it may mean either of two or more things. This language, if it means
anything at all, means what the company contends it means. The
question that Judge Bigelow was really answering adversely to the
company was whether it is to mean anything at all. The quotation from
Judge Bigelow's opinion tells us why we have asked this question and
answered it in this way. The policy purports to be a general liability
policy, and the company is contending that a broad area of general
liability is excluded from the coverage. Under these circumstances, it
is not enough that the company point to language that excludes it. The
company must point to language that makes it clear that it is excluded.
This case illustrates very well the principle just set forth. Taking the
policy as an organic whole, the reasons for splitting coverage for opera-
tions completed from coverage for operations going on are worthy of
sympathetic consideration. The quoted language defining what is com-
pleted operations coverage, and thus excluded from operations-going-on
coverage, is abstruse, but would probably have been given effect, except
for one thing. Nowhere was it made clear that completed operations
were not covered. Had the policy said in large print: "Completed Opera-
tions are not Covered," the court would probably have applied the
quoted langauge just as it was written. This language under a catchline
"products" has no different meaning from what it would have under
a catchline "completed operations." But the effect to be given it is quite
different.
These principles are perhaps given further application in the recent
agency cases, Heake v. Atlantic Casualty Co. 48 in which the policy
was so prolix and so finely printed that the insured was allowed to
46. Ibid.
47. 12 N.J. at 395, 97 A.2d at 16o.
48. 29 N.J. Super. 242, 102 A.2d 385 (App. Div. 1954), afj'd, 15 N.J. 475, 105
A.2d 526 (1954).
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reform it to conform to his understanding with the agent, even
though he had been remiss in not reading it, and Yannuzzi v. United
States Cas. Co., 49 in which the agent through whom the insured had
dealt with the company was regarded as a proper person to receive
notice called for in the policy regardless of his actual authority. In
each case, the company's disclaimer was based on standards incon-
sistent with the ostensible scope of the package of insurance the in-
sured thought he was buying. The same is true of Mattia v. Northern
Ins. Co. of New York, 0 where the insured had automobile theft
insurance under a certificate, and was held not bound by a provision
in the master policy, incorporated by reference in the certificate, which
would have excluded all coverage while the automobile was subject
to a conditional sale agreement. Again, the exclusion is not consistent
with the general scope of the coverage to be expected.
So much for considerations based on the manner in which policies
are sold and the encouragement of good draftsmanship. There remains
the standard of social context as a factor in the application of insurance
policies. This is well illustrated by the Fannick case, 51 decided during
the survey year, in which it is held that a man can be "wholly pre-
vented . . . from engaging in any and every business or occupation
and from performing any work for compensation or profit . . ." where
he ought not to work, even if he does work. The decision is an exten-
sion of a much earlier case where the insured attempted manfully to
attend to his duties, but was all but worthless in them. Here, the
insured took a job at which he performed quite satisfactorily for
some weeks, but the court still held that whether the requisite dis-
ability existed was for the jury.
If this case were socially neutral, there would be little to be said
for the result reached by the court. In fact, however, the court is, with
a good deal of justification, assimilating what the policy provides to
what it should provide. The policy was a group life contract issued
at the insured's place of employment, to terminate with the employ-
ment. If, however, death came within a year of termination of the
employment, and during the intervening time the insured was dis-
abled under the above-quoted language defining that word, the in-
surance would persist. The insured left his job on account of a
cancer that had begun to manifest itself; three months later he was
dead. Meanwhile, he had worked four weeks in a different occupation.
Although he seems to have put in a satisfactory day's work each day,
he was in a far advanced stage of his last illness all the while. The case
49. 32 N.J. Super. 373, io8 A.2d 489 (App. Div. 1954), rev'd, - N.J. -, A.2d
(q55).
50. 35 N.J. Super. 503, 114 A.2d 582 (App. Div. 1955).
51. Fannick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. Super. 556, 113 A.2d 28 (App.
Div. 1955).
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presents the figure of a man who should be allowed the advantage of
the group life insurance at the place of employment he left on account
of the onset of his fatal illness. Few are surprised at the result of the
case, and few of those who are surprised are unhappy. Insurance
policies, then, are to be interpreted in the light of their social function.
This standard was to some extent articulated in Fannick, to a larger
extent in Booth,52 its 1925 predecessor. It would seem to justify dealing
more freely with the words of a policy than does the principle that
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the insured.
Our cases, then, offer alternatives to the process of achieving just
results from wrestling with the concept of a policy as a literary whole
-a process whose fruitlessness is illustrated by the two cases discussed
above in which it was used. These alternatives are to be found in the
concept implicit in Judge Bigelow's reference to the coverage the
company "seems, in general, to have intended to afford"-what has
here been referred to as the policy read as an organic whole. That con-
cept is drawn from the logic of the underwriter's profession, con-
sidered either in itself, or in its social context. The ills that may befall
mankind have been broken down by either custom or logic or both
into separate categories, separately rated and separately insured. The
general thrust of an insurance policy will be to cover one or another
of these. categories. When a provision is unexpected in this context, it
is not enough that it be stated; fair warning of it must be given. This
is the impact of McAllister and Heake. To this Fannick adds that when
a provision is harsh or inappropriate it will be softened or rendered
appropriate by construction. These criteria are as yet incipient in our
law, but they may well develop into highly serviceable tools for making
proper use of insurance policies as social instruments.
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